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Background:  Despite  vaccination  efforts  and  documentation  of  elimination  of  indigenous  measles  in 2000,
the  United  States  (US) experienced  a marked  increase  in  imported  cases  and  outbreaks  of  measles  in  2011.
Due to the  high  infectiousness  and  potential  severity  of  measles,  these  outbreaks  require  a  vigorous
response  from public  health  institutions.  The  effort  and  resources  required  to respond  to  these outbreaks
are  likely  to  impose  a  signiﬁcant  economic  burden  on  these  institutions.
Objective:  To  estimate  the  economic  burden  of measles  outbreaks  (deﬁned  as  ≥3  epidemiologically  linked
cases)  on the  local  and  state  public  health  institutions  in the  US in  2011.
Methods:  From  the  perspective  of  local  and  state public  health  institutions,  we estimated  personnel  time
and  resources  allocated  to measles  outbreak  response  in local  and  state  public  health  departments,  and
estimated  the  corresponding  costs  associated  with  these  outbreaks  in  the US in  2011.  We  used  cost  and
resource  utilization  data  from  previous  studies  on  measles  outbreaks  in  the  US and,  relying  on outbreak
size  classiﬁcation  based  on  a case-day  index,  we estimated  costs  incurred  by  local  and  state  public  health
institutions.
Results:  In  2011,  the US  experienced  16  outbreaks  with  107 conﬁrmed  cases.  The  average  duration  of
an  outbreak  was  22  days  (range:  5–68).  The  total  estimated  number  of identiﬁed  contacts  to  measles
cases  ranged  from  8936  to  17,450,  requiring  from  42,635  to  83,133  personnel  hours.  Overall,  the  total
economic  burden  on  local  and  state  public  health  institutions  that  dealt  with  measles  outbreaks  during
2011  ranged  from  an  estimated  $2.7  million  to $5.3  million  US  dollars.
Conclusion:  Investigating  and  responding  to measles  outbreaks  imposes  a signiﬁcant  economic  burden
on  local  and  state health  institutions.  Such  impact  is  compounded  by  the  duration  of  the outbreak  and
the  number  of potentially  susceptible  contacts.
 201©
. IntroductionSince the elimination of indigenous measles from the United
tates (US) was documented in 2000, relatively low numbers of
ases per year (average of 71 cases, range 37–140) were reported
Abbreviations: CDC, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DHHS,
epartment of Health and Human Services; ID, identiﬁcation (for outbreaks labels);
ogs, logarithms; MMWR,  Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report; n/r, not reported;
/a, not applicable; US, the United States.
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during this decade [1]. However, in 2011 the country experienced
a marked increase in measles cases and outbreaks [2,3]. All ini-
tial measles cases in these outbreaks were import-associated [2],
deﬁned as meeting one or more of the following criteria, measles
cases were imported from other countries, were epidemiologically
linked to importations, had viral genetic evidence of an imported
genotype, or were epidemiologically linked to an imported virus
[2,3]. Outbreaks usually began with susceptible persons infected
with measles while staying in countries with endemic circulation
and who  became ill just prior to or after arriving in the United
States [4]. Infected persons may  transmit the disease to a number
of potentially susceptible contacts in a variety of settings includ-
ing homes, airplanes or airports [5], schools or daycare centers
[4,6,7], university dormitories, refugee camps [8], clinics and hos-
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.pitals [9,10].
Due to its high infectiousness and the potential severity of
complications, a measles outbreak often constitutes a serious pub-
lic health event entailing a vigorous response from local public
 under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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ealth departments and can involve multiple states and counties
2,11,12]. A typical response could involve a range of complex activ-
ties, i.e., conﬁrmed cases are isolated, case contacts traced and
heir disease or vaccination history assessed, potentially suscepti-
le individuals tested for immunity and, if required, vaccinated or
uarantined [11–13]. As part of the response to the outbreak, pub-
ic health departments may  need to enhance disease surveillance,
lan response efforts, coordinate response activities with health-
are providers, other public health ofﬁcials, the Centers for Disease
ontrol and Prevention (CDC), and also address public concerns and
edia attention [11–13]. As a result of the amount of effort and
esources reallocated to the outbreak response, the economic toll
n these public health departments could be signiﬁcant [11–14]. In
his study, we aim to estimate the economic burden of the sixteen
easles outbreaks reported in 2011 on local and state public health
epartments in the US.
. Methods
Using local and state public health perspectives, we estimated
ersonnel time for public health departments and costs associ-
ted with responding to the measles outbreaks (deﬁned as three
r more epidemiologically linked cases) reported in the US in 2011.
o do this, we computed average cost and resource utilization data
e.g., wages and salaries, number of personnel hours) from pre-
ious studies in the US that estimated the economic impact of
easles outbreaks on state and local health departments [11–14],
nd used these data to estimate the personnel time and costs
ttributable to the response to the measles outbreaks reported in
011.
.1. Cost studies on measles outbreaks
From a review of the literature on the economic impact of
easles outbreaks in the US [11–14], we collated data on the
eallocation of personnel and resources for the outbreak response
including investigation, contact tracking, screening, laboratory
ork, emergency response and surveillance) as well as associ-
ted costs incurred by local and state public health departments;
peciﬁcally, we retrieved data on the number of cases reported in
hese outbreaks, the number of contacts (or exposures to measles
able 1
ases, contacts, personnel hours and costs associated with measles outbreaks.
Iowa and Michigan, 2004 [11] Indiana, 2005
Conﬁrmed cases 1 34 
Identiﬁed contacts >1000e 500 
Personnel hours
Local 516 429 
State 1786 1103 
Total  2302 1532 
Hours  per contact
Local 0.5 0.9 
State 1.8 2.2 
Total  2.3 3.2 
Outbreak costs ($)d
Local 44,558 20,427 
State  137,121 39,404 
Total  181,679 59,831 
Cost per contact ($)
Local 45 41 
State  137 79 
Total  182 120 
a n/r = not reported.
b n/a = not applicable.
c Includes some federal personnel expenses.
d All costs were adjusted to 2011 US dollars using the consumer price index.
e Estimates of hours per contact and cost per contact used 1000 as the number of contane 32 (2014) 1311–1317
cases) identiﬁed, the number of hours allocated by local and state
responders, and the main activities performed during the out-
break investigations and response (Table 1). Particular attention
was given to studies that reported number of personnel hours allo-
cated to the response by local and/or state health department and
associated personnel costs. Using these data, we  estimated both
the average number of personnel hours per contact and the aver-
age cost per contact. All costs were adjusted for inﬂation to 2011
US dollars using the Consumer Price Index [15].
2.2. Measles outbreak data in 2011
Data on the number of conﬁrmed measles cases reported in each
outbreak and the duration of the outbreak were collected from local
and state health department reports for 2011 [2,8,16–20]. The dura-
tion of the outbreak was deﬁned as the number of days from the ﬁrst
to the last rash onset date reported and assumed this interval was
the minimum period during which an active public health response
was in place. Additionally, data on the number of identiﬁed contacts
for each outbreak were collected retrospectively from the affected
local and state public health departments (Table 2). Despite efforts
to standardized contacts data collection, sites resorted to either
documentation, recall, or both deﬁnitions of contacts.
2.3. Outbreak size classiﬁcation and case-day index
Due to the limitations of collecting contact numbers retrospec-
tively, we utilized an indirect approach to deﬁne outbreak size
scenarios and estimated personnel hours and costs for these sce-
narios. Speciﬁcally, we relied on the number of conﬁrmed measles
cases and outbreak duration to build a case-day index (i.e., case-day
index = number of cases times number of days) for each outbreak,
and then classiﬁed the size of the outbreak using this index (Table 2
and Fig. 1A). The rationale behind the case-day index approach is
that the magnitude of a public health response to a measles out-
break is usually driven by the number of individuals that have been
in direct contact with infective measles cases and by the time and
effort it takes to respond these outbreaks. Therefore, the magni-
tude of an outbreak response tends to be increasingly compounded
by the number of cases (and contacts), and by the duration of the
outbreak (Fig. 1A).
 [12] San Diego, California, 2008 [13] Kentucky, 2010 [14]
12 1
376 45
1355 n/ra
390 n/r
1745 387
3.6 n/ab
1.0 n/a
4.6 8.6
116,098 n/r
13,997 n/r
130,095 24,569c
309 n/a
37 n/a
346 546c
cts for this outbreak.
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Table  2
Description and size classiﬁcation of 2011 measles outbreaks in the US.
Outbreak ID [Ref.] Conﬁrmed casesa Duration (days)a Contactsb Contacts per case Contacts per day Cases-days index Size classiﬁcationc
PA1 [2] 6 21 290 48 14 126 Medium
MN1  [2] 22 68 3009 137 44 1496 Large
MI/MN/TX [2] 6 14 140 23 10 84 Medium
UT1  [16] 7 24 12,000 1714 500 168 Medium
FL  [2] 3 13 8 3 1 39 Small
KS  [2] 6 36 3000 500 83 216 Large
CA  [2,8] 3 18 126 42 7 54 Small
PA2  [2] 3 5 35 12 7 15 Small
VA  [2] 4 17 295 74 17 68 Medium
NY/MD [19] 5 14 285 57 20 70 Medium
UT2  [16] 6 24 2400 400 100 144 Medium
IN  [18] 14 26 780 56 30 364 Large
PA3  [2] 4 16 387 97 24 64 Medium
MN2  [2] 3 12 177 59 15 36 Small
CA/MD/WI/NC [2,17] 9 24 781 87 33 216 Large
NY  [2] 6 13 248 41 19 78 Medium
107  345 23,961
a For each speciﬁc outbreak the data of both the number of conﬁrmed measles cases and duration (in days) were taken from several ofﬁcial outbreak reports.
b Data on contacts to measles cases per outbreak were obtained from sites retrospectively (in 2012). Although efforts were made to collect the number of contacts to
measles cases using a speciﬁc epidemiological deﬁnition of “contact,” these data may  still have important biases in the deﬁnition, detection, documentation, reporting and
recall  of “true” contacts.
c Outbreak size classiﬁcation was based exclusively on the two-dimension case-day index to capture the impact of outbreaks based not only on the number of cases but
a ions o
h
t
i
w
a
i
(
o
c
T
E
a
1
hlso  the duration of the response. Once an outbreak size was re-classiﬁed, assumpt
igh  ranges and thresholds observed in contacts data.
Once calculated, the case-day index was then used to classify
he size of outbreaks around the 25th and 75th percentiles of
ts distribution. Then, the number of contacts per measles case
as assigned according to the classiﬁed size of each outbreak,
nd based in part on the distribution of reported contacts and
n the low and high ranges between size thresholds (Table 2)
See also Appendix Fig. A.1). Speciﬁcally, based on thresholds
bserved in contacts data, outbreaks were deﬁned as small (i.e.,
ase-day index <25th percentile, with an assumed range of 3–25
able 3
stimated low and higha number of contacts, personnel hours and costs associated with 2
Outbreak Cases-days Number of contacts 
Size/ID Index Low High 
Large
MN1 1,496 3,080 5,500 
IN  364 1,960 3,500 
CA/MD/WI/NC 216 1,260 2,250 
KS  216 840 1,500 
Medium
UT1  168 280 700 
UT2  144 240 600 
PA1  126 240 600 
MI/MN/TX 84 240 600 
NY  78 240 600 
NY/MD 70 200 500 
VA  68 160 400 
PA3  64 160 400 
Small
CA  54 9 75 
FL  39 9 75 
MN2  36 9 75 
PA2  15 9 75 
Total  8,936 17,450 
Median  240 600 
Mean  (overall) 526 1,026 
Large  1,785 3,188 
Medium 196 489 
Small  9 75 
“Low” and “High” numbers were assumed to range from 3 to 25 contacts per case (in sm
40  to 250 contacts per case (in large outbreaks). Number of hours (average 4.7 h per co
ours  and costs.n the number of contacts per measles case were assigned based in part on low and
contacts per case), medium (case index ≥25th and ≤75th per-
centiles, range of 40–100 contacts per case) or large (>75th
percentile, range of 140–250 contacts per case). After calculating
the range in the number of contacts per case for each outbreak
size scenario we  input the estimated average number of person-
nel hours (4.7 h per contact) and unit costs ($298 per contact)
from the reviewed literature (Table 1) to obtain the total num-
ber of hours and costs for all measles outbreaks reported in
2011(Table 3).
011 measles outbreak by classiﬁed outbreak size.
Personnel hours Costs
Low High Low High
14,442 25,790 918,847 $ 1,640,798 $
9,190 16,412 584,721 $ 1,044,144 $
6,348 11,336 421,244 $ 752,221 $
4,232 7,557 280,829 $ 501,481 $
1,313 3,282 83,532 $ 208,829 $
1,125 2,813 71,598 $ 178,996 $
1,125 2,813 71,598 $ 178,996 $
1,125 2,813 71,598 $ 178,996 $
1,125 2,813 71,598 $ 178,996 $
938 2,345 59,665 $ 149,163 $
750 1,876 47,732 $ 119,331 $
750 1,876 47,732 $ 119,331 $
42 352 2,685 $ 22,375 $
42 352 2,685 $ 22,375 $
42 352 2,685 $ 22,375 $
42 352 2,685 $ 22,375 $
42,635 83,133 2,741,436 $ 5,340,781 $
1,125 2,813 71,598 $ 178,996 $
2,508 4,890 161,261 $ 314,164 $
8,553 15,274 551,410 $ 984,661 $
917 2,292 58,339 $ 145,849 $
42 352 2,685 $ 22,375 $
all outbreaks), from 40 to 100 contacts per case (in medium outbreaks), and from
ntact) and unit costs (average $298 per contact) were used to estimate Personnel
1314 I.R. Ortega-Sanchez et al. / Vaccine 32 (2014) 1311–1317
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Fig. 1. Outbreak size classiﬁcation and contacts ratios from 2011 measles outbreaks.
A: Measles case-day index
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 Illustrates 15 out of 16 outbreaks. The excluded outbreak (see Table 2) was consid
In order to validate the case-day index approach, we re-
lassiﬁed the outbreaks’ size using either the contacts per case
atio or the contacts per day ratio and we observed that the size
ankings were very similar to the index approach. Moreover,
oth ratios show large positive covariance and strong correlation
R2 = 0.95) further validating our compounding hypothesis (Fig. 1B).
. Results
In 2011, 220 conﬁrmed measles cases were reported in the
S including 16 outbreaks that comprised 107 conﬁrmed cases
eported from these outbreaks. The median number of cases per
utbreak was 6 (range 3–22), and the average outbreak dura-
ion was 22 days (median 17.5, range 5–68, Fig. 2). Using diverse
pidemiological deﬁnitions of contacts and with biases in the detec-
ion, documentation and recall of “true” contacts, managers inn the estimation of the correlation coefﬁcient (R2 = 0.95).
outbreak sites retrospectively reported a median of 293 identiﬁed
contacts (range 8–12,000) per outbreak.
Based on the case-day index, 4 (25%) outbreaks were deﬁned
as relatively small, 8 (50%) were medium and 4 (25%) were large
outbreaks. Using the range of index-attributable contacts to
measles cases among these outbreaks, the number of contacts to
measles cases ranged from 9 to 75 in small outbreaks, from 160 to
700 in medium size outbreaks, and from 840 to 5500 in relatively
large outbreaks.
On average, using the case-day index a range of 526–1026 con-
tacts were attributed to each outbreak in 2011 (median range
240–600 contacts), corresponding to 2508–4890 personnel hours
(median range 1125–2813 h) and approximate expenditures of
$161,000–$314,000 (median range $72,000–$179,000) associated
with the outbreak response(Table 3). With a median duration of
17.5 days per outbreak, an active response costs a median range
I.R. Ortega-Sanchez et al. / Vaccine 32 (2014) 1311–1317 1315
Fig. 2. Measles outbreaks during 2011 in the United States by duration and number of conﬁrmed cases*.
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i Letter and numbers in the ﬁgure illustrate the outbreak speciﬁc label and numbe
utbreak.
f $4091–$10,228 per day. Average costs per outbreak ranged
rom $2685 to $22,000 for small outbreaks, from $58,000 to
146,000 for medium and from $551,000 to $985,000 for large
utbreaks.
For the sixteen outbreaks combined, the estimated total num-
er of individuals identiﬁed as contacts to conﬁrmed measles cases
anged from 8936 to 17,450. The estimated total number of per-
onnel hours for the 16 outbreaks ranged from 42,635 to 83,133
Table 3), and the corresponding total estimated costs for the pub-
ic response accrued to local and state public health departments
anged from $2.7 million to $5.3 million US dollars.
. Discussion
The collective responses to each and all the sixteen measles
utbreaks had a sizable impact on local and state public health
epartments. Our estimates show that local and state public health
esponse to measles outbreaks consume substantial personnel
ours and could impact other public health priorities as staff is reas-
igned to outbreak response. At an increased frequency of measles
utbreaks, such a diversion of public health resources to outbreaks
esponse could signiﬁcantly consume public health budgets, divert
he health priorities and roles at the local and state levels and fur-
her increase the pressure on available resources.
As an illustration of the opportunity costs imposed on public
ealth departments, we estimated that the number of person-
el hours responding to these sixteen measles outbreaks would
equire the full time work of 20–39 public health ofﬁcers dur-
ng a year (i.e., assuming 2080 h/year or 40 h/week). Likewise,
ncluding cost of other inputs and materials, each public health
epartment that experienced a measles outbreak in 2011 would
ave incurred a median range cost of $11,933–$29,833 per measles
ase. These costs, however, are not exclusive of measles out-
reaks since about 113 (51% of the 220) measles cases reported
n 2011 occurred by deﬁnition not in outbreak settings yet theyonﬁrmed cases. The length of the symbol repetitions indicates the duration of the
may  have demanded a similarly resource-intensive response from
local public health departments. A very conservative estimate
(i.e., assuming only three contacts per case) of the impact of the
113 non-outbreak measles cases – isolated or fewer than three
epidemiologically linked cases – would add approximately 1579
personnel hours and would increase total costs by approximately
$100,128.
Measles outbreaks will likely continue to occur in the US mainly
because of the persistent risk of imported measles cases derived
partly from the increased disease transmission and number of
outbreaks in the European region [21]. Such a risk is magni-
ﬁed by the presence of susceptible sub-populations in the US
due to lack of vaccination, the variety of potential outbreak set-
tings (hospitals, clinics, airports, cruise ships, etc.), the limited
state and local response capabilities, and the lack of awareness of
vaccine recommendations in a few susceptible individuals travel-
ing to endemic countries. Beyond the impact on local and state
public health departments, responses to measles outbreaks also
affect hospitals, clinics [9,22], as well as non-health public depart-
ments such as schools, universities and occasionally local police
departments enforcing quarantines or supporting control actions
[11,13]. Additionally, susceptible individuals and their households
face higher health risks derived from potential serious measles
complications (i.e., otitis media, pneumonia, encephalitis or death
[23]) along with associated medical and productivity lost costs
[23,24].
This study has some limitations. The personnel costs used for
this study were based on average estimates of data reported in
four previous studies published before 2011. Unit costs are likely
to vary between departments in various locations, and are dictated
by both the variation in wage rates as well as the intensity of the
response to the outbreak (e.g., departments with more resources
may  mount a more expensive but more effective response, while
those with fewer resources are unable to respond as quickly or
effectively). Finally, the retrospective nature of gathering data on
1 / Vaccine 32 (2014) 1311–1317
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Fig. A.1. Number of reported contacts per case by measles outbreak in 2011*: Def-
inition of thresholds and ranges of contacts per case.
[
[316 I.R. Ortega-Sanchez et al. 
he number of contacts traced for the outbreaks could have intro-
uced recall bias of reported number of contacts. However, it is
ncertain how much or in what direction this bias would have
ffected the reported number of contacts and our estimates. To
mprove the validity of future estimates, a plan to collect and
nalyze data from outbreaks should be put in place and standard-
zed.
In conclusion, staging effective responses to measles out-
reaks have a sizable economic impact on local and state public
ealth departments. The costs of measles outbreaks responses are
ompounded by the duration of outbreaks and the number of
otentially susceptible contacts. Outbreak-response estimates not
nly substantiate the sizable amount of resources and costs allo-
ated by local and state public health departments, but also provide
 perspective of what additional resources and capacities might be
eeded to respond to future outbreaks.
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[* The red line describes the moving average of reported contacts and helps to illus-
trate the threshold used to assigned range of contact to outbreaks after their sized
was determined by the case-day index.
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